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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
W. B. RUSSE:LL,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY AND
DEPOT C0~1:P ANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
As the facts before the lower ·court were, for the
most part, admitted by the pleadings, or stipulated,
there is no dispute with respect thereto. As this factual
situation may be briefly developed, we take the liberty
of so doing, realizing that to some extent it is repetitious
of appellant's statement. We refer to the parties as
they appeared in the lower court, namely, as plaintiff
and defendant.
On August 3, 1945, plaintiff was employed as a
switchman by defendant at its yards in Ogden. He had
there been so employed for approximately four years.
His employment was covered by a collective bargaining
agreement entered into between defendant and the
Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, and he was entitled
to the benefits and subject to the burdens thereof. This
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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collective "I?a.rgaining agreement is in~ evidence as Plaintiff;s Exhibit "E". Plaintiff did not return to work
following the completion of his work day on July 21,
1946. On July 31 or August 1, 1945, (there being a
conflict between the pleadings and the evidence) at
approximately 6:30 o'clock in the morning, defendant
called plaintiff by telephone and told him that a formal
investigation. would be held by defendant that day at
2 :00 o'clock p. m. concerning his violation of the collective bargaining agreement by being absent without
leave for a period of over ten days. At plaintiff's request the time of the investigation and hearing was
continued and on August 2, 1945, plaintiff was notified
by defendant to appear on August 3, 1945, at 9:00 A. ~I.
for hearing upon such charge.
On August 3, 1945, the hearing was held in the
offices of the defendant company, and conducted by Mr.
H. Caulk, defendant's Assistant Superintendent. The
complete hearing was reported by Mr. Caulk's clerk,
and transcribed. The only witness called at such hearing was plaintiff and his statement was made primarily
pursuant to questions propounded by Mr. Caulk. The
transeript of the hearing "ra.s received in evidence in
this cause as Plaintiff's Exhibit'' A''. As it is relatively
short, and as it is of importance to at least some
phases of this appeal, we set it out in full.
''Transcript of formal investigation conducted
in office of Assistant Superintendent OUR&D
Co. 9· AM August 3, 1945, in connection with
Switchman W. B. Russell being absent from duty
over 10 days without leave of absence in violation
of B.R.T. Sehedule Rule 55 B.
2
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Offic_ers Present :
H. Caulk, Ass't Supt. OUR&D Co. Conducting
b 1nptoyees Interrogated:
W. B. Ruseell, S\vitchmru1, OUR&D Co.

Representatives of Emp-loyes:
J. B. Hudgens, Representing W. B. Russell
Reported by :
J. E. U. Burton, Clerk to Ass 't Supt,
OUR&D Co.

Questions by: 1ll r. Caulk:
Staten~ents

of

lv·. B. Russell:

Q Mr. Russell this in an investigation relative·
you being. absent from duty over 10 days
without leave of absence in violation of BRT
Rule 55 B. Do you w1sh a representative.
A

Yes sir, Mr. Hudgens.

Q State your name, occupation and home address.
A

/

W. B. Russell, Switchman, 933 Ogden Canyon.

Q How long have you been employed by the
OUR&D Co.
A

August 28 will be 4 years.

Q Do you know the rule that you will not absent
yourself from duty 10 days or over without
written leave.
A

Yes sir.

Q Why didn't you obtain written leave.
A

Because I was sick in bed at the time.

Q Why didn't you ask the office for leave of
absence.
3
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A

I called just as soon as I got out of bed,. soon
as they called me and told me I was over it.

Q

What other business are you engaged in that
you cannot work for the Depot Co.

A

None of my own.

Q Are you working any place else.
A

No.

Q

I understand you own a Club up the canyon.

A

No.

Q You work up there don't you.
A Yes. No.

Q Do you know how many days you have worked
this year.
A

Yes I do.
Q It hasn't been very many has it.

A

No, I have had more sickness than I have ever
had in my life, you can go back on my record
and see. I had measles, was scalded and now
down with a cold.

Q You state you have been here four years.
A

Four years August 28th.

Q And you have never asked for leave at any
time layed off.
A

Never went over 10 days except when scalded.

Q

You have made it your business to work some
time in each half.

A

Ye·s.

Q

The fact of matter is. you worked as follows
during this year.
4
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1st half January,. 8 days
2nd half January, 8 days
1st half February 7 days
2nd half February 6 days
1st half ~!arch 6 days
2nd half ~larch 6 days
1st half Ap·ril 2 days
2nd half April 6 days
1st half I\Iay 4 days
2nd half nlay 6 days
1st half June 1 day
2nd half June 2 days
1st half ·July off 11 days injured and worked
only two days in second half of July since
you were injured.
A

That is when I layed off sick, I got scalded·
went to work and layed off sick.

Q That doesn't relieve you, you could tell us
you were sick at that time and told them had
to have leave of absence and could have gotten
leave at that time.
A

I didn't figure I would be off that much time,
just had cold when layed off, I have been to
a doctor.

Q You haven't worked since have you.
A

No I haven't. I had had more trouble with
sickness than any time since I have been down
here.

Questions by Mr. Hudgens:

Q While you were sick during this last period of
time were you attended by Co. doctor.
A

Yes, Dr. Stratford.

5
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· Q And you talked to .tr~in desk before the exp~ration

A

of your 10 days.

No. They called me on the 31st, they called
me out of bed at 6 :.30 AM and told me to be
here for investigation and I was too sick and
couldn't make it.

Q Do you have

a. release from the doctor.

A No, I am still under his care.
I have read the above and it is
correct:
Transcript correct:
s/9 J. E1. 0. Burto-n''

/s/ Wm. B. Russell

W. B. RUSSELL

On August 4, 1945, defendant dismissed plaintiff
from its service, assigning as its reason therefor that
plaiutiff had been absent from his employment for a
period of over ten days in violation of Rule 55 (h).
Rule 55 (h) for the asserted violation of which plaintiff
was so discharged~ is as follows:
''Yardmen taking leave of absence for a
period of over ten days must secure and fill out
Form 153 so the leave will he covered as a matter
9f record.''
On January 14, 1946, and within a p·eriod of six
months from the date of discharge, pJaintiff filed with
defendant written objections to his dismissal, and requested reinstatement. (Exhibit "B"). On January
22, 1946 defendant, through its Superintendent, reaffirmed the dismissal, saying: (Exhibit C)
6
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January ·22, 1946
''nir. J. B. Hudgens, Local Chairman
S"itehmen's Union of North America, Lodge
No. :279
804 - 7th Street
Ogden, Utah
Dear Sir:
Referring to your letter of Jan. 14, 1946
making claim for reinstatement, with pay, favor
S\Yitchman W. B. Russell \vho was dismissed from
service Aug. 4, 1945 for being· absent in excess
of 10 days without written leave of absence:
The rules require yardmen to have a written
leave to be absent from duty 10 days or more.
Russell failed to do this, and it is my position
that the action taken in his case is fully justified.
Claim is therefore respectfully declined.
Yours truly,
/s/ R. E. Edens''
On February 15, 1946, Mr. C. E. McDaniels, Acting
Vice President of Switchmen's Union of North America,
presented to 1Ir. F. C. Paulsen, Vice President of the
defendant company what in effect was a petition for
review by Mr. Paulsen of Mr. Edens' reaffirmance of
the dismissal. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "D"). This was
supplemented by a communication from 1\tir. ~fcDaniels
to Mr. Paulsen dated April 1, 1946. (Defendant's Exhibit 4). On May 14, 1946, 1\tir. McDaniels further wrote
Mr. Paulsen (Defendant's Exhibit 3), and as the defendant claims much in his brief for this particular
communication, we set it out in fulL
7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.. ''Offi~e of Acting Vice President

134 Cleveland Avenue
Salt Lake City 4, Uta.h
May 14, 1946
Mr. F. C. Paulsen, Vice President
Ogden Union Railway and Depot Co.
10 South Main Street
File OUR&D-3
Dear Sir:
Reference is made to our conference·, your
office, May 7, 1946, in connection with your file
011.221 attached to our grievance, reading:
'Claim for reinstatement, with seniority
rights unimpaired, and compensation at the
applicable rate, August 6, 1945 and each SUBSEQUENT date thereto until restored to service favor switchman W. B. Russell, Ogden
Yard, account dismissed from the service
August 4, 1945 for his alleged responsibilty
i_n connection with unauthorized leave of
absence'
in connection with the reinstatement of former
.switchman W. B. Russell, Ogden, Utah.
As agreed during our conference, further
action on the subject matter was to be held in
abeyance pending our investigation of undesirable procedure on the part of Mr. Russ.ell resulting in false testimony evidenced during formal
investigation of August 3, 1945.
This investigation has been completed and
it is without prejudice to our contentions and
position as expressed in our letter of February
15, 1946 and without establishing a precedent
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a~

to adjustment of future grievances ·possessing dissimilar facts and circumstances· devolving
upon similar allegations as appear in the introduction of the formal investig-ation of August
3, 19±5 \Ye are \Yithdra"'ing- the grievance and
the case is closed.
Yours truly,
/s/0. E. McDaniels
C. E. ~1cDaniels, Acting Vice
President, S. U. of N. A.
PS : Note change in address.
Phone 7-7 593''
Thereafter this action '"·as commenced whereby
plaintiff sought the judgment of the court for reinstatement, and damages for all time lost, predicating
such claim upon his contention that his discharge had
been wrongful, and upon Section 38 of the collective
bargaining agreement, reading, so far as here pertinent,
as follows:
'' 38. Investigations : No yardman will he suspended or dismissed without first having a fair
and impartial hearing and his guilt established.
* * * * *
In case dismissal is found to be unjust, yardman
shall he reinstated and paid for all time lost * * *.
NOTE-Reinstatement will not be permitted
after the expiration of six months from date of
dismissal unless agreeable to the managment
and the general committee, except that a case
pending with either the B.R.T. or O.R.C. at the
exp~ir~tion of the six month -p.eriod, will not be
prejudiced. Where the yardman involved has
been out of service six months or less it will not
9
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~e obliga.tory
se;ntj~g thes~

.to co;nsult the eommittees repre·-.
classes ·of employes in considering
the case for reinstatement.''

Upon ·conclusion of the trial, the court made and
entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and its judgment, whereby it determined plaintiff's discharge to
have been wrongful, denied plaintiff reinstatement,
but awarded him judgment for all time lost.

THE NATURE OF THE CASE ON APPEAL
Inasmuch as the lower court denied to plaintiff
his prayer for reinstatement, and plaintiff did not appeal
from that ruling, that phase of the case is not before
this court. Accordingly, we are at a loss to understand
why the question of reinstatement is dealt with so extensively by defendant in its brief.
Actually the only questions here involved are
(1) Did the lower court commit reversible error in
its rulings on evidentiary matters;
(2) Did it commit r-eversible error in denyj.ng
defendant's motion for non-suit:
(3) Was it oorrect in concluding that under the facts
plaintiff's discharge vras wrongful ;
( 4) Did it apply the correct rule in its dete-rmination of the dollar amount of recovery to which plaintiff was entitled for his wron,gful discharge.
Defendant contends that the lower eourt was wrong
on each of the matters, and that we, as pl~aintiff's counsel, pawned off on the lower cour.t a ''bill of goods''.
We naturally resent the implication thus embodied in

10
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the defendant\~ characterization ·of our efforts on behalf of the plaintiff, and submit that is is wholly unjustified. EYery proposition urged by us in the lo,ver
court "~as and is supported by la"y' and that the lower
rourt 's acceptance of our position was correct under
the law ".,.e shall no'Y demonstrate. In so doing· we shall
ans,Yer defendant's contentions point by point, and in
the order presented in defendant's brief.

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
ADMITTING THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE
PROCEEDING AT THE OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION AS SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE OF
THE. FACTS THEREIN STATED.
At the outset it may be advisable to make some
comment with respect to the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States relative to the jurisdiction
of state courts to hear and decide actions such as this.
The first is Moore v. Illinois Central Railway Co., 312
U. S. 630, 85 L. Ed. 1089, 61 S. Ct. 754. In this case it
was categorically held that a state court had jurisdiction to determine an action for damages by an individual against a railroad for breach of a collective bargaining agreement.
~Ioore

case was followed by Slocum v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad, 338 U. 8. 229,
94 L. ed. 535, 70 8. Ct. 577; Order of Railway Conductors v. Southern Railw~ay Co., 339 U. 8. 255, 94 L. ed.
542, 70 8. Ct. 585; and Order of Railw~ay Conductors
v. Pitney, 326 U. 8. 561, 90 L. ed. 318, 66 S. Ct. 322. These
cases differed from the Moore case in that whereas in
The

11
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the Moore case an individual was suing for breach of
the agreement, in the other three cases the actions were
between the unions and the carriers se·eking judicial
interpretations of collective bargining agreements. In
the Slocum and Southern Railway cases, actions were
brought for declaratory judgments interpreting the
agreements; the Pitney case was a jurisdictional dispute involving the railroad and two unions. The Supreme Court in each case held that interpretations of
collective bargaining agreements of the character there
sought la.y with the Adjustment Board under the Railway Labor Act, and not with the courts, but in so holding it did not distrub its decision in the Moore case to
the effect that an individual might seek recourse in the
courts for personal redress for breach by a carrier of a
collective bargaining agreement. In fact the Moore
case was specifically reaffirmed. In this connection
the Supreme Court in the Slocum case said:
''Our holding here is not inconsistent with
our holding in Moore v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 312
U. 8. 630, 83 L. E·d. 1089·, 61 8. Ct. 754. Moore
was discharged by the railroad. He could have
challenged the validity of his discharge before
the Board, seeking reinstatement and hack pay.
Instead, he· chose to accept the railroad's action
in discharging him as final, thereby ceasing to
he an employee, and brought suit claiming damages for breach of c~ntract. As we there held,
the Railway Labor Act does not bar courts from
adjudicating such cases. A common-law or sta. tutory action for wrongful discharge differs from
any remedy which the Board has power to provide, and does not involve questions of future
relations between the railroad and its other employees. If a court in handling such a case must

12
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consider some proYISlon of a collective-bargain- ·
ing' agreement, its interpretation "'ould of course
h::;.\·e no binding- effeet on future interpretations
by the Board.''
Personally, '"e do uot believe there is any disagreement bet\veen counsel for defendant a~nd ourselYes on this point, although "'e do eonceive a disagreement as to the jurisdiction of a state court in the matter of reinstatement, and, it is perhaps well to pinpoint
our Yie,Ys on that matter as it may have some bearing
on the question of the measure of recovery, although
the question of reinstatement itself is not before this
court.
\\?' e understand it to be counsel's position that

while a state court has jurisdiction to entertain an individual's suit for damages for breach of a. collective
bargaining agreement, it has no jurisdiction to order
reinstatement, and counsel derives its comfort for this
position from the decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States, sup·ra. We submit, however, that
such point was neither involved nor so decided in any
of such cases. It was at one time in the Moore case, as
an examination of the history of that case discloses, and
its disposition is interesting.
.1\Ioore first brought an action against the Yazoo
&]}J. V. R. Co. and Illin.ois Central Railroad Co., 166
So. 395, in connection with his seniority rights, claiming that the carrier had wrongfully assigned him number 57 instead of 37. The Supreme Court of Mississippi
dismissed his action, holding that by failing timely to
protest his seniority assignment, and accepting work

13
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assignments thereunder, he had waived his right to invoke the a~d of the court. The significant part of the
decision is that it is predicated upon a waiver of rights
and nowhere does the court suggest that in the absence
of such waiver it was without power to aid him.
Later Moore was discharged from service for ''unsatisfactory conduct'', and following such discharge
brought an action for damages for wrongful discharge
under the collective bargaining agreement. This action
was brought in the courts of Mississippi, was removed
to the federal court, and ultimately reached the Supreme
Court of the United States. M aore v. Illinois Central
Ra.ilroad Co., Supra. It involved no question of reinstatement or seniority; as his earlier case did. It was
therein definitely settled that the courts had jurisdiction of his individual claim under the collective bargaining agreement, and if any implication is to be drawn
therefrom it is that the court, having jurisdiction to
adjudicate his rights to damages under the contract,
likewise had jurisdiction to adjudicate his right to reinstatement under the- contract had he sought reinstatement in his action.
Other cases may he cited which, while not strictly
on all fours with the factual situation in the present
case, indicate the power of the courts to deal with the
question of reinstatement as· well as with the monetary
recovery to which a wrongfully discharged employee
may be entitled. Thus, in the case of Fine v. Plat (Tex.)
150 S. W. (2nd) 308, it was held that a seniority right
is a contract rig·ht which will be .protected by the court,
and that the court had power to require specific performance of an agreement fixing the plaintiff's seniority
rights.

14
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In tlle case of Heasley v. Plasterers' Local No. 31, ·
(Pa.) 188 .A.tlanti.c 286, in w'hich it 'vas held that the
court had jurisdiction to compel reinstatement, the
court 'Yent on to say that the right to contract for work
is a property right, and the court has the power to restrain its impairment.
In the case of Locomative Engineers v. M·i!lls, (Ariz.)
31 Pacific (~) 971 the Supreme Court of Arizona said
that an interference with a man's livelihood is sufficient to give a court jurisdiction as such an illegal act
amounts to interference with a visible property right.
In that case the court took jurisdiction to pre~ent the
interference with a railway employee's seniority as
against the contention that such seniority was not a
property right granted to and vested in the individual.
Finally, in the case of Coyle v. Erie Ra.ilro.ad Company (N. J.) 59 .AtlOJntic (2) 817, which case involved
an action brought for reinstat~ment and for wages lost
as a result of an improper discharge, the court ordered
the plaintiffs reinstated to their former positions with .
the employer, with their seniority rights. unimpaired a.s
well as back pay from the time of their dismissal to
the time of their reinstatement
We unduly labor the point, howeiVer, as the court
in this case denied reinstatement.
To return now to the specific point involved under
this heading, namely, the admissabilty as substantive
evidence of the transcript of the hearing which resulted
in plaintiff's discharge. In considering this matter it
must be borne in mind that the parties had a written
contract covering the employment, and this contract
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dealt specifically with the matter of :plaintiff's discharge-. The first sentence of Rule 38 provided:
''No yardman will he suspended or dismissed
without first having a fair and impartial hearing
and his guilt established." (Italics added)
That the last phrase relates to the hearing necessarily follows. In other words, before the plaintiff
might properly be discharged, charges of misconduct
must be· brought against him, he must have a fair and
impartial hearing on such charge, and his guilt of the
offense charged must he estabHshed at the hearing.
Anything less would he a mockery. If he might be discharged ·for matters other than those involved in the
charge, or if his guilt as to the charge might be determined other than as a result of the hearing, the provision
for a fair and impartial hearing becomes meaningless.
Therefore. we submit, the contract itself provides that as a condition to proper dismissal a charge
must be brought, a fair and impartial hearing had on
the charge, and his guilt of the charge established at
the hearing.
Now what is· the best evidence as to whether (1) a
charge was made; ( 2) a fair and impartial hearing
on the charge had; and (3) guilt of the charge established wt the hearing. The answer is obvious. It is the
record of the hearing itself, and that is what was introduced in evidence, and what defendant now complains
of. The re.cord of the hearing shows on its face that
it was taken and prepared by defendan~t's own representatives, and eounsel for defendant stipulated that
such record (Exhibit "A") constituted a complete
transcript of the hearing. ( Tr. 5).
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Thi~

is by no means tl1e case of Ten~nison. ·v. St .
Lou-is-San Fra·ucisco Ry Co., ____________ ]J:] o·--------~---, 228 S.
lV. (~) 713, relied upon by defendant. In that case the
contractnral pro,Tision \vas:
'·Trainmen shall not be suspended, discharged,
or unfavorable entries made against their records \\yl.thout just and sufficient cause".
The court, in construing this provision said:
'·What the contract provided was that trainmen
would not be discharged 'without just and sufficient cause'. ~Iethods were provided for a full
investigation of charges and hearing of the employee's side before action. However, defendant is no more precluded thereby for litigating in court the issue of ' just and sufficient
cause' than is plaintiff. Both may bring in any
competent evidence they have and object to any
incompetent evidence; and there is no estoppel
against defendant because Foster was heard at
the investigation required by the contract.''
In other words, the crux of the matter was whether
there was in fact "just and sufficient cause" for the
discharge, and whether such just and sufficient cause
did in fact exisf was a matter to be determined by the
court on competent evidence there presented; that an unsworn statement of one not a party to the litigation was
hearsay, and not admissible.
Here the contraotural provision is :
''No yardman will be suspended or dismissed
without first having a fair and impartial hearing
and his guilt established.''

17
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In the Tennison case the right of proper discharge
was predicated upon the existence of ''just and sufficient
cause''. Such ''just and sufficient cause'' might exist
independe:nt of any hearing, and, if it did in fact exist,
would justify dismissal.
In our case, the right to proper discharge is conditional upon a hearing and the establishment of guilt at
the hearing. Just and sufficient cause in our case is not
sufficient. Our contract conditions the right to discharge upon the establishment of guilt at the hearing.
Thus, we say that there is no relationship between the
Tennison case and ours.
The same is true as to the second case relied on by
defendant, namely, Johnson v. ThompBon, ____ .____ M o·--------,
236 S. W. (2) 1. In that case the contractural provision
was:
''Any conductor may he suspended from duty
for a reasonable time, or for investigation of any
alleged misconduct, or for viola;tion of rules or
orders, and may be discharged from the service
of the company for good and sufficient causes.
* * *
Thus, in the Johnson case the court held that the
question it was trying under the contract was whether
''good and sufficient cause'' for discharge existed. In
our case the question under the contract was whether
plaintiff's guilt of the charge against him had been
established at his hearing. The distinction between the
two is vital, and plaintiff's rights under the contract
must not be lightly discarded. Here the defendant
agreed that plaintiff might not be discharged unless
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certain conditions were established. Because other contracts in1pose milder conditions upon other carriers is
not here our concern.
Defendant's position simply is that irrespective of
"~hat deYeloped at the hearing-, evidence thereof was
inadmissable. .A..11 assumption 'vill demonstrate the fallacy of this reasoning-. Let's assume that at the hearing· it "~as conclusively established that plaintiff was
not in fact absent ·without leave for a period in excess
of ten days, yet defendant nevertheless discharged him
for violation of that rule. Under those circumstances
could it be suggested that the record of that hearing,
which thus conclusively established plaintiff's innocence of the charge, could not he admitted in evidence
of the fact that his guilt had not been established at the
hearing1 Such is in fact our case. The record of the
hearing was offered solely for the purpose of proving
that at the hearing plaintiff's guilt had not been established. The establishment of his guilt was a condition
to defendant's right of discharge, and the reception in
evidence of the record of the hearing was, accordingly,
proper.
The situation here is not dissimla.r from that existing with respect to determinations by administrative
bodies generally. Whether such bodies in acting upon
matters within the scope of their authority acted arbitrarily or capriciously, and \Vhether a fair hearing was
had, is to be determined by the court in the light of the
record of the hearing. In the instant case the transcript
of the hearing conclusively shows that guilt was found
by the defendant without a scintilla of evidence to support such finding. Thus it is that defendant finds it
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necessary not only to ·seek to suppress the record of the .
hearing it held, and following which it acted, but also
to justify the action it took by other alleged acts of miseonduct which were neither the subject of the hearing,
nor then a.ssigned by the defendant a.s grounds for plaintiff's discharge.
POINT

ii

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT
RIDVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NONSUIT.
The answer to this point of argument is obviously
simple. Plaintiff had a prima facie case for recovery
upon the basis of the pleadings and stipulation alone. In
other words, it was admitted and stipulated that plaintiff had been employed by defendant; that his employ~
ment was covered by the collective bargaining agreement; that defendant had discharged him; that but for
the discharge he -could have worked for defendant; and
that as a, result of his discharge his earnings from defendant had been lost to him. It was further admitted by
the parties that under the c.ollective bargaining agreement defendant's right to discharge was limited by the
provisions of Rule 38. Under those circumstances the fact
of disc.ha.rge alone made out a prima facie case for re-covery. . The burden was then on the defendant to establish that the discharge was in accordance with the eontract.
Defendant's own case of Johnson v. Thompson,
supra, affirms this proposition. In it the- court said:
20
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~' 1'h~

contract of employment \va.s admitted in
this case and the terms thereof, that is, that
derea~t'd '"as employed as conductor by defendant in continuous employment. Under the ple·adings it '""as admitted that deceased was discharged
from his employment June 12, 1948, by the defendant, for alleged Yiola.tion of its rules. Unde-r
interrogatories allS"\Vered by defendant, evidence
as to the loss of earnings "\vas sho,vn. The facts
further offered by plaintiff show that the
deceased offered to continue his €mployment but
that such employment was refused. We think
this evidence made a prima facie case. The justification of the discharge was affirmatively
pleaded in defendant's answer and the burden of
e-stablishing this defense was upon the defendant."
In addition, however, to these admissions and stipulations, which in and of themselves made out a prima
facie case, there was before the court at the· time the
motion for non-suit was made, the transcript of the hearing upon 'Yhie-h plaintiff's discharge was predicated, and
which transcript showed on its face that plaintiff had
not wilfully or otherwise violated the rule he was charged
with having broken.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN LIMITING THE EVIDENCE ON THE QUE.STION OF
WHETHER OR NOT DE·FENDANT HAD
BREACHED THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT SOLE~Y UPON THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE UNSWORN TESTIMONY
GIVEN AT THE OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION;
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IN REFUSING TO ADMIT EiVIDENCE PROFFERED BY THE DEFE.NDANT TO SHOW
JUSTIFICATION FOR PLAINTIFF'S DISMISSAL; AND IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE
DE<FENDANT TO PROVE THAT PLAINTIFF'S
TESTIMONY CONTAINED IN SAID TRANSC·RIPT WAS FALSE.
We have heretofore demonstrated under Point I
hereof the correctness of the lower court's ruling in
admitting in evidence the transcript of the hearing as
hearing upon whether or not the defendant's discharge
of plaintiff came within the contractural limitations
thereon; that is, as bearing upon the question of whether
plaintiff's guilt of the offense with which he was charged
was established at the hearing. We now have before
us the question of whether the court should have received other evidence tending to establish justification
for plaintiff's discharge upon other grounds.
Stated another way, was the trial court limited in
its determination of the propriety of plaintiff's discharge to a consideration of the hearing actually had,
or could it consider other grounds the defendant might
have had for discharging defendant, but as to which no
charge was ever made or hearing had.
The specified charge· against plaintiff was that he
had absented himself in excess of ten days without
leave. This, and no other matter, was the subject of the
hearing, and upon this ground, and no other, was he
discharged.
It is further to be noted that nearly five months
-after the initial dismissal this alleged absence without
written leave was still the only ground relied up-on by
22
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defendant as justify·i·ng the charge. vVe invite attention to thL) h_~t ter of defendant·~ superintendent, R. E.
Edens. llated Jauunry ~~' l~l-l-;) (Plaintiff's Exhibit
~' C ''), hereinbeforL) set out in full herein. In rejecting
plaintiff~~ request for rein~tntement "\Yith pay Mr. Edens
said:
· ·l,he rules require yardmen to have a written
leaYe to be absent from duty 10 days or more.
Russell failed to do this, and it is my position
that the action taken in his case is fully justified.
Claim is therefore respectfully declined.''
It "~as not until after this action was brought that
defendant realized that its original ground for discharge, confirmed some five months later, could not
successfully "\Yithstand the scrutiny of the courts, and
that it then began to cast about for some other basis upon
which to justify its action. And so at the trial the defendant offered to prove as justification for plaintiff's
dismissal, not his violation of this rule, but
(1) That he was but an intermittent worker, and

thus unsatisfactory;
(2) That in truth and in fact plaintiff was not sick

during the period in question, but physically
able to work; and
(3) That in testifying as he did at the hearing that
he was sick, when in truth he was well, he had

lied.
Several items of evidence were offered, but we believe
they all come within one or the other of the above three
categories.
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Let'-s consider the second category first; ·that i'3,
that plaintiff was in fact able to work during the period
in question.
Wbether or not he w.as sick was a subject for inquiry a.t the hearing had on August 3, 1945, as that constituted plainti~f 's excuse for his absence from work.
However, instead of developing that subject to its satisfaction at that time, defendant elected to accept the
testimony of plaintiff himself with respect thereto. No
continuance was requested by defendant to meet plaintiff's testimony in this regard.
Nor could it contend, nor does it, that it was ~aken
by surprise. at the hearing as to the reason assigned by
plaintiff for his absence, i. e. that he was sick. On July
31st, or August 1st, (as the case may be) defendant's
representatives talked with plaintiff by phone, and were
at that time informed by plaintiff that his illness was
such that he could not that dav attend the scheduled
hearing. Defendant, therefore, was fully informed as
t.o the reasons assigned by plaintiff for his absence, and,
during the two or three day interim between the date of
this phone- call and the hearing, had every opportunity
to procure and present at the hearing such evidence
as it might have, (including the testimony of its own
doetor Stratford, whom plaintiff had consulte-d relative
to his illness) tending to contradict plaintiff's testimony
that. the reason for his absence- was his illness. But
instead of so doing defendant was content with the testimony as introduced, closed its hearing on that testimony,
and discharged plaintiff on the basis thereof.
ol
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Let's reverse the situation and see \vhere it lea~s,
because any rule in this regard must of necessity work
both \Ynys.
Let·~

assume that plaintiff \Yns silent at the hearing, and that the eYidence adduced thereat by his employer 'vas adequate to establish his guilt, and based
thereon he \Yas discharged. He then brought an action
for "~rongful di~r.harge, and in response to his employer's reliance upon the eYidence adduced at the hearing- he then urged upon the court other evidence tending to disprove that "~hich 'Yas established at the hearing;. Is the court to be permitted to try that question
over ag·ain, and determine as a result of such new hearing that the discharge was improper and thus hold the
employer liable for wrongful discharge~ Or will the
court say, ''No, you had your hearing, and full opportunity to develop the evidence you now seek to introduce.
The defendant, iu discharging you, was entitled to rely
thereon., and you will not now be permitted to go beyond
that 'Which 1_,0as there presented.''
We submit that in equity and justice under a contract such as this neither party may go beyond the
hearing. Each party must present his case in full
thereat, or be foreclosed. At the conclusion of the hearing the parties' rights and responsibilities are fixed,
and they may safely chart their future course in the
light of ·w·hat the hearing established.
Now, as to categories (1) and (3); namely, that
plaintiff was but an intermittent worker, and thus
generally unsatisfactory, and that plaintiff testified
falsely at the hearing. What we have heretofore said
as to the conclusiveness of the hearing in fixing rights

25
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and responsibilities is here applicable. Further than
that, we say that the contract itself does not permit a
hearing upon one alleged ground for dis·charge, a discharge upon that ground, and then a justification for
the discharge upon some other ground.

The- contract provides that before a covered employee may be discharged, an offense must be charged
and a hearing had thereon. The contract does not permit a man to be discharged upon one ground, and then
justification for the discharge had upon some other
ground as to which he has had no opportunity to he
heard.
Under a contract such as this a proper discharge
may not be had without a hearing, nor may a discharge
he supported upon grounds other than those stated in
the specific charge. In Kiker v. Insurance Company,
(N. M.) 23 P. (2) 366. the court said:
''Generally, in an action for wrongful discharge, the employer may plead in defense any
sufficient cause·, though it may have been unknoWn to him at. the time, though his real reason or motive may have been something else,
arid though another cause may have been expres-~
·sly ·as-signed. Williston on Contracts, Sec. 744,
839; La batt ·on Master and Servant, Sec. 187;
Page on Contracts (2d Ed.), Sec. 3058; 19 R. C.
L. 516; 39 C. J. 89.
''But the parties of course have the right to
stipulate the maner in which the employer may
terminate the contract. If they stipulate that
it shall be by written notice sp·ecifying the cause,
a discharge specifying no cause, or an insufficient cause, would be wrongful. It follow'S that,
26
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under such a contract, a ca,use not ~pecified would.
not be arailable in defense. Hughes v. Gross et
al, 166 ~Jas~. 61, 43 N. E. 1031, 3~ L. R. A. 620,
55 Am. St. Rep. 375, cited; 18 R. C. L. 516, 1\tlortimer v. Bristol, 190 App,. Div. 452, 180 N. Y. S.
55.''
In ('~ole v. Lowe's, Inc., Inc., 8 Fed. Rules Dec. 508,
the court said :
''Where the contract specified grounds for
termination or suspension and written notice
is provided for, the employer, in order to justify
his action, must show that the ground given in
the notice actually existed. He cannot justify
his action on other grounds named in the contract, which, although true, were not stated in
the notiee. ''
And in Levy v. Jaratt, (Tex) 198 8. W. 333, the
court said:
"If the acts of misconduct other than planning to enter business for himself now charged
aginst the plaintiff would have justified his discharge, they were not made the basis of the terminition of the contract and could not affect the
plaintiff's right to recover on it, as the defendant at that time did not treat such acts as being
a breach of contract. * * *."
Thus, we respectfully submit as the contract calls
for a charge, a hearing, and the establishment of guilt,
as conditions to discharge, the employer cannot justify
a discharge on grounds other than those embodied in
the charge and made the subject of the hearing. As
that is what the proffered testimony was directed toward, the lower court was correct in excluding it. And
27
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we cannot conceive that any carrier, operating under
con tracts such as this, would consciously want the precedent established that a court, in trying the question
of wrongful discharge, might go beyond the evidence
adduced at the hearing itself. For under such a precedent, as heretofore pointed out, an employee might stand
silent a.t the hearing, permit himself to be discharged,
and then in a subsequent action for damages, prove to
the court by evidence that he should have presented at
the hearing that he was innoc.ent of the charge upon
which he was dismissed.

POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ASSESSING .A.ND
FIXING DAMAGES:
(A) IN RE:FUSING TO ALLOW AS MITIGATION OF DAMAGES THE AMOUNT OF
MONEY EARNED BY THE PLAINTIFF IN
OTnER EMPLOYMENT BETWEEN THE
DATE OF HIS DISMISSAL BY THE
DEFENDANT AND THE DATE OF TRIAL;
(B) IN HOLDING THAT THE MEtASURE
OF DAMAG-ES FOR BREACH OF THE CONTRACT WAS THE AMOUNT PLAINTIFF
WOULD HAVE EARNED HAD HE WORKED
EACH AND EVERY DAY AT HIS FORMER
EMPLOYME1NT WITH THE DEFENDANT
BETWEEN THE RECIPT BY DEFENDANT
OF HIS APPLICATION FOR REINSTATEMENT AND THE DAY OF TRIAL, SEPTE1IBER 7, 1950, A PERIOD IN EXCESS OF FIVE
YEtt\.R.S;
28
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(C) IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE
DEFENDANT TO PROVE THAT THE PLAINTIFF DURING HIS E~IPLOYMENT BY THE
DEFENDANT WORKED ONLY A PORTION
OF THE TI~lE ALTHOUGH STEADY
E~IPLOY~IENT WAS AVAILABLE TO HIM.
(A) Subdivision (a) under this point of argument
relates solei!~ to the question of 'Yhetber in determining
the amount of plaintiff's recovery for his wrong·ful discharge, earnings of plaintiff in other employment bet"Teen the date of his dismissal and the date of trial are
to be deducted from the amount he could have earned
from defendant but for the wrongful discharge.

In support of its contention that these interim earnings should be deducted, defendant relies upon the general proposition, with which we have no quarrel, to the
effect that the measure of damages for breach of an employment contract generally is the amount the employee
'vould have received under the contract, less what he
has earned during the period. The difficulty with the
application of this general rule to this particular case
is that here the parties themselves have specifically
contracted for the measure of recovery by plaintiff
from defendant in the event of wrongful discharge.
Rule 38 of the collective bargaining agreement provides:

''In case dismissal is found to be unjust, yardman
shall be reinstated and patid for all time lost.''
That the parties are fully competent and have the
right to contract with respect to the measure of recovery
in the event of a breach of the contract there can be no
doubt. Indeed, a provision in an employment contract
29
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liquidating th·e: damages in the ev·ent of a breach is
deemed appropriate. In ·31 Am. J ur. (Labor) Section
127, it is thus 8tated:
'~It

is not improper in a collective bargaining
agreement to provide for the payment of liquidated damages in case of breach by the employer
without also providing for payment of such damages by the union.''
And in 35 Am. Jur. (Master·and Servant) Section 76:
'' The injury caused by the sudden breaking off
of a contract of service by either party involves
such difficulties concerning the actual loss as
to render a reasonable agreement for stipulated
damages appropriate.''
Defendant's position in this regard is wrapped up
in the Slocum case, and its statement on page 51 of its
brief succinctly states its position. This contention of
defendant as so stated is as follows:
''The case holds that courts have no jurisdiction
other than to try a simple common law action
for damages for breach of contract; that they
cannot interpret the contract; that they cannot
pass on the question of whether or not an employee is entitled to reinstatement, or to any other
benefits under the contract. They have jurisdiction to decide ( 1) was the contract breached,
(2) if so, the damages if any, and nothing else.
And they have absolutely no right to apply any
other principles in assessing damages than those
that have always been recognized in courts of law
in simple contract action.''
We now propose to take defendant's position, as
set forth in its foregoing statement, point by point, and
show its fallacy.
30
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The first proposition is that the Sloeum case holds
that ''courts have no jurisdiction other than to try a
simpl~ common-la,v action for damages for breach of
contract". "re submit that the Supreme Court of the
United States in the Slocum case made no such holding.
The language of that court in that case is:
''We hold that the jurisdiction of the Board (Railway Labor Board) to adjust grievances and disputes of the type here involved is exclusive.''
(Italics added)
The dispute in the Slocum case involved conflicting
claims between two unions with respect to certain jobs
with the railroad. The railroad brought an action in
the state courts of N e'v York for a declaratory judgment
as to which of the two unions had jurisdiction over
these jobs. The effect of the Supreme Court's decision
is simply that in jurisdictional disputes involving collective bargaining agreements, the Railroad Labor
Board has exclusive jurisdiction. In no wise does the
court's decision purport, other than in the specified
instance there involved, to limit the jurisdiction of the
courts.
Defendant's second proposition is that under the
Slocum decision a court is without jurisdiction to inter~
pret the collective bargaining agre-ement. The Slocum,
decision however, says just the contrary. We -again
quote therefrom:
''Our holding here is not inconsistent with
our holding in Moore v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 312
U. S. 630, 85 L. ed 1089, 61 S. Ct. 764. • * *. As
we there held, the Railway Labor Act does not
bar courts from adjudicating such cases. A common law or statutory action for wrongful dis-
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·charge. differs from -any remedy which the ·Board
has power to provide and does not involve ques.
'
t1ons between the railroad and its other employees. If a court in handling such a case must
consider some provision of a collective bargainitng agreement, its interp·retation would of course
have no binding effect on future interpretations
by the Board." (Italics added)
Thus, 've see that instead of holding that a court is
without power to interpret provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement, it specifically reaffirms that in
actions for wrongful discharge, such as the present
case, the court must of necessity interpret, and it has
the power to interpret, the contract as it hears on the
right of recovery.
Defendant's next propostion is that under the Slocum decision a court is without power to pass on the
question of ''whether or not an employee is entitled to
reinstatement'' or ''to any other benefits under the
contract''. We do not concede the accuracy of this
assertion as it relates to ''reinstatement'', but do not
argue it further as the· problem of reinstatement is not
here involved. As to the right of the court to interpret the contract in relationship to benefits confe-rred
upon a.n employee· wrongfully discharged, in an action
it has before it arising out of such discharge, the decision is explicit in its affirmance- of that right.
Defendant's final assertion is that under the Slocum decision courts have "absolutely no right to apply
any other principles in assessing damages than those
that have always been recognized in courts of liaw in
simple contract action". Well, of course, it's obvious
tha.t the Slocum decision contains no expre-ssion at all
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in that regard.

If a court has jurisdiction to entertrun
an action for "'Tongful disr.harge~ and there can be no
question but that it has, the measure of recovery will be
in acrord 'vith the terms of the contract, and neither the
la,vs of Utah or of the United States provide. against
the parties to a contract agreeing to the measure of
recovery in the eyent of a breach, which is what the
parties here haYe done.
\"Ve inYite the attention of the court to its decision
in the case of Foxley v. Rich, 35 Utah 162, 99 Pacific
666, as follo,vs:
·'Where the parties themselves stipulate what
the result of a breach of a particular contract
shall be, the courts ordinarily have no authority
to impose other consequences than those agreed
upon.''
Also, to the case of Rose v. Garn, 56 Utah 533, 19. Pacific 645, as follows :
''No court has ever held that the parties may not
agree between themselves as to the measure of
damages that shall be sustained upon the breaching of a contract by either party."

And in the concurring opionion to the above case, Mr.
Justice Frick observed:
''Parties to a contract, unless prevented by public
policy or some postive law, have the- same right
to determine and fix the consequences of a breach
of the contract that they have to agree upon any
other proper provision. and, in case they have so
agreed, courts must enforce their agreement. In
that regard the -case at bar, in my judgment, falls
squarely within the rule laid down in the case- of
Foxley v. Rich, 35 Utah, 162, 99 Pacific 666.''
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It remains only for the court to interpret the provisions in the contract
''In ease dismissal is found to be unjust, yardmen
. shall be reinstated and p·aid for all time lost,"
Having now, we believe, successfully laid at rest
any assertion that the Slocum case deprived the court
of interpreting this provision of the contract, and applying it in fixing the amount of plaintiff's recovery, we
give consideration to what it means. The difference
here between plaintiff and defendant is simple. Plaintiff
asserts that. it means earnings which otherwise would
have acerued to him from his employment at the railroad, without deductions. Defendant, on the other hand,
contends that it is such earnings, less interim earnings
from other sources between the time of discharge and
trial.
In support of its position defendant relies upon the
case of Eubanks v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. (Texas)
59 S. W. 285, decided by the Supreme Court of Texas
May 3, 1933. In that case the contract provided that
in the event of wrongful discharge the employee should
be paid ''for all time lost''. The Texas court, without
setting forth in its opinion its reasoning in arriving at
its conclusion, held that this meant that earnings be·tween the date of discharge and the date of judgment
must be deducted.
That the Texas court in so holding reached what
we believe to be an erroneous conclusion is evidenced by
the ruling of the Railroad Labor Board itself on this
point. In Award No. 13048, Docket No. 22098 of the
National Railroad Adjustment Board, The Chicago,
Rock Island and Pacific Railway Oomp·any, decided
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October ~5, 1949, this particular phrase ''and· paid for
all time lost'' "·ns carefully and extensively analyzed,
both from the standpoint of the language of the phrase
itself in the light of the general rule "-rith respect to mitigating damages, and from that of public p·olicy, and its
conclusion " . .as that earnings from other sources were
not to be deducted. This "'"as the conclusion reached by
the lower court in this case.
In view of the importance of this particular question we take the liberty of quoting from the decision of
the National Railroad Adjustment Board in connection
with this award.
''The carrier urges substantially that if the
claim is to be sustained on account of wrongful
dismissal the award should be for pay for time
lost from the carrier less earnings of claimant, if
any, he made in other employment between the
time he was discharged and the time reinstated.

In an approach to a determination of this
question, it becomes necessary to examine the
pertinent rule. The rule is Article 23 (d) as follows:
'Should such investigation prove the engineer
unjustly disciplined, it shall be corrected and
his record cleared; in case the suspension of dismissal is found to be unjust, he shall be reinstated
and paid for all time lost.'
This provision of the agreement under law
fixes the rights of the engineer and the liability
of the carrier in the case of unjust suspension
or dismissal.

If the literal ·wording of th!is rule is to be
accepted it appears that thereby the carrier binds
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itself to pay an eng~neer unjustly suspended or
dismissed for all of the time which he lost iln the
posit~on from w'hich he was removed, and this
without regard to any question of earnings elseW'here during the period of separation. To interp·ret it otherwise would be to give the words a
meaning of which they are clearly not capable.

If they arH to hH given a different meaning,
as the carrier insists that they must, that is that
they must be interpreted to mean that an engineer
shall be paid for all time lost less such earnings,
if any, as shall have been received over that
period from other employment, the reason therefor must come from some source other than the
contract itself.
It is without question the general law of the
land than an improperly discharged employe is
required to make the best use of his time to seek
other employment, and that having done so the
discharging employer is entitled to have the earnings thereof set off in mitig-ation of the damage
or against what he was entitled to receive under
the contract of employment which was breached.
The carrier substantially contends that this
general principle of law must be read into thi~
provision and become a part of it and that a failure to do so is contrary to law and public policy.
No hesitancy is encountered in declaring
that if the contract was silent, or unexplainably
ambiguous, or provided that he should be reimbursed for his loss as distinguished from his time
lost, or was couched in any terms othHr than a
spHcific declaration that he should be paid "for
all time lost'', the principle contended for by the
carrier would be applicable and controlling.
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There is another well reconized principle of
la"r "yhirh, sinre the agreement is specific in its
terms, requires consideration here. The principle ·ts that parties capable of contracting may
enter in.fo a contract which is enforceable if it
relates to a proper subject 1natter, and such a
conft·act is not condemned as 1J;nenforceable by
lazp or public policy, e1·en though it contra.venes
a principle of lan' ord-in.a'rily deemed to be and
accepted as limitation 1,tpon an ord1:nary contract.
The principle is one "\Yhich guarantees and protects the right to freedom of contract in the absenc.e of prohibition of law or of pt1hlic policy.
The effect of the rule is to say that a contract
is enforceable .and shall be enforced according
to its terms unless it runs counter to a prohibition of law or of public policy.
Is therefore, the principle for which the carrier contends a prohibition in situations such as
this under law or public policy~
Railroad labor relations with which the Adjustment Board has power to deal are controlled
by the laws of the United States.
No statute of the United States ha.s been
found which directly or by reasonable implication prohibits or declares a public policy the effect
of which is to prohibit enforcement of such contracts as this one in accordance with their specific terms.
In some of the state courts and in at least
one Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States
the view of the carrier bas been sustained by deci-

.

SlOn.

The decisions of the state, courts may be
said to be controlled in the states where ren·37
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dered put they can lJ.ave no effect upon contracts
entered into pursuant to the laws of the United
States.
As to the decision in the Circuit Court of
Appeals case, in the light of considerations well
known to all, it is belived that the declaration
there, instead of declaring the true public policy
of the United States with reference to contracts
such as this one, runs counter thereto.
The courts do uphold and enforce contracts
which provide for payment for damage on breach
in excess of damage sustained, except in those
jurisdictions wherein there is a prohibition, and
even in those allo,vance is made as liquidated
damages if the amount bears a reasonable relation to the actual damage sustained. As is well
known particularly in connection with Office
of Price Administration functioning, the Congress has enacted and dec~ared and the United
States Courts have approved, instead of condemning, a policy of exacting damages in excess
of the actual damage sustained for entry into
illegal contracts and for breach of legal contracts. In numerous instances the allowable
amount was three times the actual damage.
With this line of legislation and judicial
determination as an analogy it appears necessary to say that the enforcement of such contracts as this according to their literal terms
does not offend against the laws of public policy
of the United States.
Nothing having been found in the statutes
of the United States or its public policy which
prohibits or prevents enforcement of the contraot in accordance with its specific terms and
clear meaning, the finding is that the claimant
38"
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should be paid for all time lost w~hile he tvas able
to and co1tld have ~vorked in his assignment without deduction of outside earnin.gs, if any." (Ita . .
lies added)

We submit to the court the persuasiveness of the
reasoning of the Railroad Adjustment Board in reaching the conclusion it did. We also invite the attention
of the court to that phase of the decision of the Supreme
Court of the {Tnited States in the Slocum case, supra;
''The ~ldjustment Board is well equipped to
exercise its congressionally imposed functions.
Its members understand railroad problems and
speak the railroad jargon. Long and varied
experiences have added to the Board's initial quaIlfications. Precedent's established by it, w·hile
not necessarily binding, provide opportunities
for a desirable degree of uniformity in the interpretation of agreements throughout the nation's
ratilway system." (Italics added)
(b) and (c). The lower court held that the amount
of plaintj.ff's recovery was upon the basis of the amount
that he would have earned if he had worked for defendant every day from ten days ·after his application for
reinstatement to the date of trial, and declined to consider evidence to the effect that prior to his discharge
he had not worked steadily.
It was stipulated and agreed hy the defendant that
work was available continuously from the date of plaintiff's discharge, and that plaintiff's seniority was such
that but for his discharge he could have worked every
day from the date he was dismissed to the date of trial.
Having thus agreed that work was available, and tha.Jt
plaintiff could have so worked every day, defendant
39
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then offered to . prove that during his four years of
employment he had riot worked every day, and also to
prove the days during such period he had been absent.
The purpose of this proof, as stated by counsel for
defendant, was to establish a pattern from which the
court might infer that as he had worked less than full
time prior to his dismissal he would have, worked less
than full time subsequent thereto. (Tr. 36)
We submit that the ruling of the lower court was
proper for two reasons. First, the nature of the offer
left it entirely too speculative to permit the drawing of
inferences. Was the reason for his pre-dismissal
absences due to circumstances within his control, and
which would continue 1 Were they caused by lo~r s.eniori.ty ratings no longer affecting him 1 Were there
illnesses or accidents responsible 1 In other words,
c.ould the work history of this man during the first
four years of his employment in an industry, in which
seniority plays so important a factor, be of any value
a.t all in determining the probabilities of t~e amount of
days he would put in thereafter in the light of' a then
seniority which would permit him to work every day
if he so desired. It appears to us, as it appeared to
the lower court, that the proffered evidence was entirely
too speculative to be of any value, particularly as the
mostit would do \vas. to show a. pattern from which the
court would have to draw inferences.
The second reason why the rejection of the evidence
was proper is to be found in the last paragraph of the
deeision of the Railroad Labor Board in the Chicago,
Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company case, supra,
wherein the Board held:
40
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~ .. ~~X othing l~aving··been

found in the statues
of the United· Stat~s or- its public policy which
prohibits or prevents enforeement of the contract
in accordance 'Yith its specific terms a1Hl c.lear
meaning, the finding is that the claimant should
be paid for all time lost 1vhile he was able to and
could hare lvorked in his assignment without
deduction of outside earnings, if any." (Italics
added)
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
REFUSING TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT
TO PROVE THAT IT WAS POWERLESS TO
REINST~~TE
THE PLAINTIFF IN HIS
E~IPLOYMENT AFTER THE EXPIRATION
OF SIX l\IONTHS FROM THE DATE OF DIS~IISSAL WITHOUT THE CONSE:NT OF THE
BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN,
AND IN EXCLUDING DEFENDANT'S PROFFER OF EVIDE:NCE TO SHOW THAT THE
BROTHERHOOD OF RAJLROAD TRAINMEN
WAS NEVER AT ANY TIME WILLING TO
CONSENT TO PLAINTIFF'S RE~INSTATE
MENT BY THE DEFENDANT.
A note to Se0tion 38 of the agreement provides in
part as follows :
''Reinstatement will not be permitted after
the expiration of six months from date of dismissal, unless agreeable to the management
and the general committee, * * *.''
We're off again on this matter of reinstateme·nt,
and as the defendant persists in arguing it, we must
answer in self defense, as we do not want it understood
that we agree that the foregoing provision of the contract constitutes any present defense to defendant's
failure to reinstate plaintiff.
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At the outse~t it should he observed .that the fore~
going provisions comes into the agreement as a "Note"
to the- portion of Rule 38 that immediately precedes it,
and which relates to the dismissal of yardmen. It is
obvious that it relates to a rightful dismissal, and not
a wrongful dismissal. In other words, where an
employee has been rightfully discharged, he will not be
reinstaked by the employer without the union's consent.
The· reason for this is obvious. Upon reinstatement an
employee assumes his former seniority rating, which
affeets the seniority status of many other employees.
Hence, the union naturally wants a voice in the matter
of such reinstatement. Wby it is tied in to the six
months period the writer is not informed, but it is to he
assumed that seniority rights may not be fixed within
such limited period, and thus a reinstatement within a
period of six months may not have the adverse effoot
on other employees that a later reinstatement would
have.
But defendant now would extend it to cover a
wrongful discharge, as well as a rightful one·. In other
words, that it can wrongfully discharge an employee arbitrarily refuse to reinstate him for a period of six
months - and then escape entirely the consequences
of its unlawful conduct by smugly asserting that both the
union and itself are not agreeable to giving the employee
hack the, job from which he had been wrongfully dismissed. We cannot conceive that. any court would countenance any such course of conduct, nor tha.t this court
will render any -comfort to the defendant on this ground.
If this plaintiff was wrongfully discharged, the law and
the contract has given him his remedy, and it is not to
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be taken from .hinl by any arbitrary failure of the defendant to reetify the "~rong" 'vi thin the six month's period. T"To 'vrongs do not inake a right, and if the defendant was wrong in dismissing him in the first instance
it doesn't make it right by simply refusing to reinstate
him until after a period of six months has elapsed.

Further than that, and even if it be assumed that
the proYision relates to a 'v-rongful discharge:, which
requires a tortured interp-retation of the word ''discharge'', it is of no avail to the defendant, beeause, if
such note is actually a part of the contra0t itself, this
particular provision is of no force or effect. In Piercy
v. L. & R. Co. (Ky.) 2±8 S. W., 1042, it is held:
''The primary purpose in the org,anization
of labor unions and kindred organi~ations is to
protect their individual members and to secure
for them a fair a.nd just remuneration for their
labor and favorable conditions under which to
perform it. Their agreements with employers
look always to the securing of some right or privilege for their individual members, and the
right or privilege so secured by agreement is the
individual right of the individual member, and
such organization can no more by its arbitrary
act deprive that individual member of his right
so secured than can any other person. The organiation is. not the agent of the member for the purpose of waiving any personal right he may have,
but is only his- repres·entative for the limited p·urpose of securing for him, together with all othHr
members, fair and just wages and good working conditions. Hudson v. C., N. 0. & T. P. Railway Co., 152 Ky 711, 154 S. W. 47, L. R. A.
(N. S.) 184.
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If the right of seniority may be changed or
waived or otherwise dispensed with by the act
of a bare majority of an organization, to which
the one entitled thereto is a member, it would
be builded upon a flimsy foundation of sand
which might slip from under him at any time by
the arbitrary action of the members, possibly
to serve their own selfish ends in displacing him.''
This view was affirmed in the case of System Federation N~tmber 59 v. Louisiana A. & A. Railw,ay Company,
119 Federal (2) at page 514. Further, in the case of
Henry S. Grove, 22 Fed·. (2) 444, it was held that an
individual cannot he deprived by a union of any subtantive right he has.
We refer also to the numerous awards of the Railroad Adjustment Board and to the eourt decisions cited ·
by defendant in its brief to the effect that the disciplining of employees, and the hiring and firing thereof,
is- the prerogative of management. Defendant cannot blow hot and cold on this thing a.t the: same time,
and its now pious protestations that in refusing to reinstate the pl,aintiff to the position from which he was
wrongfully discharged constituted ''maintaining the
integrity of the agreement'' is frivolous.
However, this all relates to the question of reinstatement, which is not before this court. It was before the
lower eourt, and that court refused to reinstate. Whether
the lower court was right or wrong- whether its denial
was actuated by this argument or some other - is really
now immaterial.

POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO
44
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FIXD THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS WITHOUT _A_NY RIGHT TO l\IAINTAIN AN
_[\.CTION FOR DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF
THE CONTRACT, OR IF SUCH RIGHT AT
ANY TI~IE DID EXIST, IN FAILING TO
FIND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS FORECLOSED AND ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING THE SAJ\fE.
Defendant's argument under this p-oint is more
difficult for us to follow than any that precedes it.
Apparently two propositions are involved, first, that
~fr. ~fcDaniels in writing the defendant as he did under
date of ~lay 1!, 194±, (Defendant's Exhibit 3) in effect
released the defendant from any liability to plaintiff,
and, second, if that letter did n-ot cons,titute a releas,e,
plaintiff's failure to prosecute any further claim until
May 22, 1949, 'vhen this act~on was commenced, effected
an estoppel.
This involves the assumption, :Dor the sake of the
argument, that plaintiff had been wro-ngfully discharged
and as a consequence h~ad a claim for redress against
defendant. Upon that assumption we examine the question of the effect thereon of Mr. McDaniels' letter of
May 14, 1946. That letter is as follows:
134 Cleveland Avenue
S~alt

Lake City 4, U tab
May 14, 1946

"Mr. F. C. Paulsen, Vice Preside-nt
Ogden Union Railway and Depot Co.
10 South ]dain Street
Salt Lake City 1, U tab
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Dear Sir:
. Reference is made to our conference, your
office, M~ay, 1946, in connection with your file
011.221 a~ttached to our grievance, reading :
'Claim for reins.ta.tement, with seniority
rights unimpaired, and compensation a.t the
applicable· rate, August 6, 1945 and each SUBSEQUENT d!a.te thereto until restored to service favor switchma,n W. B. Russell, Ogden
yard, account dismissed from the se-rvice
August 4, 1945 for his. alleged responsibilty in
connection with unauthorized leave of absence'
in connection with the reinstatement of former
switchman W. B. Russ.eil, Ogden, Utah.
As agreed during our conference, further
action on the subject matter was to he held in
aheJJance pending our investigation of undesir·ahle procedure on the part of Mr. Russell resulting in false testimony evidenced during formal
investigation of August 3, 1945.
This investigation has been completed and it
is dithout prejudice to our contentions and position as expressed in our letter of February 15,
1946, and without establishing a precedent as to
adjustment of future grievance poss.essing dissimilar facts and circumstances devolving upon
similar allegations as appear in the introduction
of the formal investigation of August 3, 1945 we
are withdrawing the grievance and the case is
closed.
Yours truly,
PS: Note change in
Phone 7-7593

add~ess..
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·/sjC. E:. ~fcDan.iels
C. E. Mc.Daniels, Acting Vic.e
President, S. U. of N. A."
Prior thereto plaintiff had authorized the Switchman's union to represent him as his ''agent and representative in the prosecution of grievance claim'', and to
act as his '' a.g·ent and representative * * in all further
prosecution of the * * g-rievance", and to "negotiate,
adjust and dispose of the grievance claim in any manner". (Exhibit B)
Defendant's first point is that by virtue of the
authority vested by Exhibit B, the letter of May 14,
1946 constituted a release. We disp·ose of that contention by observing that an effective release requires consideration, and defendant does not suggest. that the letter of May 14, 1946, whatever it may have been intended
to mean, is supported by any consideration.
We pass, therefore, to the next question as to
whether it can he said to be in effect a statement of
abandonment by plaintiff of his claim for redress., and,
if so, if pl·aintiff was, on May 22, 1949, when t.his action
was commenced, estopped from prosecuting his claims.
As it is contended by defendant that the authorization (Exhibit B) operated to constitute the officers of
the Switchman's Union as plaintiff's agent with authority
broad enough to cover a.n abandonment of the claim,
it is well to pause here long enough to consider briefly
some fundamental principle:S of the law of Agenc:y. Thefiduciary character of the relations.hip is pointed out
in 3 C. J. S. (Agency) Section 138, as follows:
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''As has been pointed out in Section 1 of
this Title, the relationship existent between
principal and agent is a. fiduciary one, demanding conditions of tru-st and confidence. Accordingly, in all transactions concerning or affecting the subject matter of his agency, it is the
duty of the agent to act with the utmost good
faith and loyalty for the, furtherance and advancement of the inte~rests of his principal.''
Now what is the authority of an agent, engaged for
the purpose of handling a claim for redress, to bind his
principal by a voluntary ack:n,owledgement that the principal has no right to redress. The broadest scope of an
agency of the type here involved is that which exists
between attorney and client, and if it he said said that
this agency was of equal breadth, nevertheless it would
not and could not encompass the power of retraxit, which
is the voluntary acknowledgement that plaintiff has no
cause of action. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of N. Y. v.
Phillips (Ark) 169 8. W. (2) 132.
As stated in 7 C. J. S. (Attorney and Client) Section

87:
"Retraxit. The entry of a retraxit, which
operates as a perpetual ba.r to the ,cause of action,
must, ordinarily, be, made by plaintiff in person, a.s s,tated in the title Dismissal and Nonsuit Section 5 (18 C. J. p. 1148 notes 38-42) and
his attorney has no implied or app,arent authority
to take such action but can do so only where he
has been specially authorized by his client, unless
there is a statute veSrting a party's attorney of
record with such power."
And Glover v. Bradley (C. C. A. 4th) 233 Fed. 721:
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'~X or

has an attorney the po,ver, exeept
under special authority, to exPentP a retraxit or
diselaimer, or other,YisP to bind the client by
the surrender of his rights: for a retraxit, or disclaimer, or other form of a surrender, being in
the nature of a. release, must be made by the
party himself. Dickerson y·. Hodge, 43 N. J. Eq.
10 .A..tl. 111; Thompson ,~. Odum 31 Ala.. 108, 68
Am. Dec. 159; Gorham Y. Gale, 7 {~o,v. (N. Y.)
739, 1 I Am. Dec. 549; Hallack Y. Loft, 1g. Colo.
7±, 3± Pac. 568; Coates v-. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 15
Ariz. 25, 135 Pac. 717; Turner v. Fleming, 37
Old. 75, 130 Pac. 551, ±5 L. R. A . (N. S.) 265,
Ann. Cas. 1915B, 831: Forest Coal Co. v. Doolittle, 54 \V. Va. 210, 46 S. E. 238. In Kingsbury v. Buckner, 134 U. S. 650, 10 Sup. Ct. 638,
33 L. Ed.
Now, where is the special power in this authoriza.- ·
tion which vests the Switchmen' union with the authority
effectively and conclusively to bind the plaintiff· by a
voluntary acknowledgment that plaintiff has no valid
claim for redress f
The duty of an agent is the furtherance of his principal's business; not the retarding thereof, or its abandonment. This is particularly true with respect to the
relationship between a union and its members, as e-videnced by the decisions in Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry.
Co., and supra, and System Federation No. 59 v. Louisiana A. & A. Ry. Co., 119 Fed. (2) 514.
Wbat meaning is to be assigned to the- word "dispose'', in the phrase ''negotiate, adjust and disp·ose
of"? We submit that it embraces acts similar to negotiation and adjustment, and none other. Certainly not
the waiver, release or abandonment of plaintiff's rights.
49
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One of the:· earliest ca.ses we find . reflecting upon this
matter is that of Love v. Pamplin, 21 Fed. 755, in which
the Circuit Court for the Western District of Tenness,ee was called upon to construe the meaning of the word
''dispose'' in the phrase ''sold, leased or disposed of''.
The court reached this conclusion:
''The langua.ge of the p~rohibition is that the
reservations shall not he 'sold, leased or disposed of'; and although the words last used 'disposed of' might seem to embrace other dispositions than those of sale and lease, yet they
canot, upon the principal noscitur a sociis be
extended so as to include any other than those of
a character like those specially named.''
The application of this doctrine in the decided cases
is legion. In the interests of brevity we- cite only the
case of State v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (A_la)
72 So. 99·:
"The maxim 'noscitur a sociis' means that
general and specific words which are capable of
an analogous meaning, being associated together· take color from each other, so that the general words are restricted to a se-nse analogous
to that of the less general. ''
We ·submit, accordingly, that the word ''dispose
of"; taken in conjunction with the less genelral words,
and particularly in conjunction with the evident purpose of the authori~ation as a whole, is limited in meaning by the more restricted words with which it is associated.

Now as to the question of estoppel, which defendant ra1s.e~s as a bar to plaintiff's action. As. preliminary to this, however, is a determination of whether
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the letter of :Jfr. :\1cDaniels to defendant justifies the
interpretation defendant 110\Y seeks to plaee thereon,
namely, that insofar as plaintiff is eonrt:\rned, he acknowledged he had testifed falsely a.t the hearing, and
he \Yould not further prosecute his claim for redress
for his diseharge. The second paragraph of the letter
states:
~'As

ag·reed during our conference, further
action on the subject matter was to be held in
abeyance pending our investigation of undesirable procedure on the part of Mr. Russell resulting in false testimony evidenced during formal
investigation of August 3, 1945. ''
All this says is that the union is investigating the
contention that Russell testified fal~se1y. We then go
to the next paragraph, as follows:
''This investigation has been completed and
it is without prejudice to our contentions and
position as expressed in our letter of February
15, 1946, and without estahli~shing a precedent
as to adjustment of future griev~ances possessing dissimilar facts and circumstances devolving upon similar allegations 318 appear in the
introduction of the formal investigation of
August 3, 1945 we are withdrawing the grievance and the case is closed. ''
Here Mr. McDaniels says the investigation is completed, but is entirely silent on what conclusion was
re.ached. Defendant says this constitutes an admission
by plaintiff th~at plaintiff testified falsely, but how
defendant twists the statement that the investigation is
completed, into an acknowledgement of guilt, is not
apparent. The lette·r goes on to say ''we are withdraw-

51

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ing the grievance and the case is closed", but this is·
tied into the phr,ase that precedes it that "it is without
prejudice to our contentions and position as expressed
in our letter of February 15, 1g.46' '. In the letter of
February 15, 1946, the position had been taken that
plaintiff had been wrongfully discha/rged, and was
entitled to redress.

By the letter of May 14, 1946, all that is

s~aid

is
that "without prejudice" to the contention that plaintiff had been wrongfully discharged, ·and was entitled
to redress, ''we'' (that is the union) are withdrawing
the grievance and the ease is closed. In other words,
without prejudice to plaintiff's rights, we (the union)
are withdrawing the grievance, To us, all it means
is, that for reasons best known to the union, notice is
given to defendant that it is withdrawing from its representative cap~acity, and withdrawing the grievance it
filed on his behalf, but, such withdrawal is without prejudice to any further action plaintiff himself might care
to take.
Fairly contrued the letter simply says: So far as
the union is concerned the case is closed. So ~ar as the
individual is concerned, our closing of the case is without prejudice to him, and leaves him free to pursue
whatever remedie,s he may have.
In this connection it should be borne in mind that
following plaintiff's discharge, his application for reinstatement, and defendant's denial of ~such appli0ation
for reinstatement and reaffirmance of the discharge
and the ground thereof, all within the period of six
months from the date of discharge, plaintiff's rights,
if any he had, were fixed. He could pursue those
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rights either before. the. Railroad Adjustment Board,
or befort) the eourts. Before doing Pither, he eleeted
to giYe the railroad further opportunity to revie"T hi~s
grieYance.

The union, ,,..hich \Yas undertaking this latter step
in his behalf, then ""'ithdre\Y the grieYance and closed
the case insofar as it "~as concerned. But in so doing
the union could not prejudice \Vhat rights plaintiff had
by reasons of the discharge and the defendant's cateiorical refusal to reinstate him. Nor did the union
attempt so to do, but on the contrary made its \vithdraw1 of the matter upon the expre-ss conditton that
is was '' ""'ithout prejudice'' to plaintiff's position as
set out in his application for reinstatement dated February 15, 1946.
But defendant claims that, regardless of what the
letter meant, it \Yas entitled to and did rely upon it a.s
constituting an abandonment by plaintiff of his claim
for redress, and plaintiff is now estopp·ed from prosecuting his claims. Before considering this matter
further, it may be well to have in mind certain fundamental concepts.
First. Estoppel cannot be founded upon an illegal or invalid act. 31 C. J. S. (Estoppel)
Section 72.
Hence, if, as we contend, the union was without
power or authority to surrender plaintiff's right of
redress, its attempt so to do cannot give rise to an estoppel.
Second. It is essential to an equitable estoppel
that the person asserting the estoppel shall
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have do:Q.e or omitted some act or changed
his position in reliane:e upon the represtations or conduct of the person sought to
he estopped. A change of position which
will fulfill this element of estoppel must
be actual, substantial, and justified. 31
C. J. S. (Estoppel) Section 72.
How does the- defendant seek to meet this test?
We quote from its brief, page 63:
"The detriment lies in the fact that the
plaintiff caused the defendant by his representations to c.ease weighing and considering the
disposition of the claim, treating the matter as
closed and not as an outstanding claim with, as
it must always be considered, the possibility of
ultimate liability.''
Let's analyze the situation. Defendant had discharged plaintiff; plaintiff had raised the question of
the propriety of the discharge and asked for reinstatement. Defendant's superintendent had reviewed the
case, and formally advised plaintiff of his affirmance
of the discharge. Plaintiff's representative had then
requested defendant to further consider the matter,
and when it was in that sta.tus advised defendant that
without prejudice to the claim of wrongful discharge
it (the union) was withdrawing the grievanee. Now
defendant says that had it not been for the withdrawal
of the grievance it might possibly have changed its
mind. At the outset, this f~ails. to meet the test that the
change of position which will constitute an estoppel must
be "actual and substantial", bec.ause all that defendant will agree to is that hut for the letter it might have
given plaintiff some faVro:vable consideration.
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Third. The doetrine ·of estoppel is· for the protection of innorent person, aud only the innocent n1ay inYokt:> it. .A. person may not asHPrt
an estoppel for the purpose of obtaining the
benefit of, or shielding himself from, the results of his own wrongful act. 31 C. J. S. (Estoppel) Section 75.
For the purpose of considering the defense of estop- ·
pel it must be assumed that at the outset the defendant
was the "~rong doer, and plaintiff had a claim for redress,
of his wrongs, for otherWise the asserted defense has
no place in these proceedings. We therefore have an
outstanding example of a wrong-doer seeking to invoke
the equitable doctrine of estoppel as a shield against
the consequences of his own wrong.
And defendant's only answer to the dilemma it thus
finds itself in is that had the plaintiff proceeded against
defendant immediately it might have effected some
settlement of plaintiff's claim for redress in some manner less exp·ensive to it than ultimately resulted, that
is, by possibly reinstating him on a ''leniency basis'' or
"on probation", or "without loss of seniority rights",
or "with some back pay". In other word~s, had negotiations not been broken off, defendant might have been
successful in effecting a compromise of plaintiff's
claim. The ans.wer to it is that, in the first place, such
possibilities of a compromise cannot form the basis of
an estoppel, and, secondly, defendant never did, nor
does it now, affirmatively assert that there was ever
anything in the picture, so fiar as it is concerned, other
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than that· embodied in the letter of its superintendent'
dated January 22, 1946, wherein it reaffirmed the discharge, and the propriety thereof.
Fourth. Before an estoppel can be raised there must
be ·Certainty to every intent, and the facts
alleged to constitute it are not to he taken
by argument or inference. Nothing can
be supplied by intendment.
No one
should he denied the right to set up the
truth unless it is in plain contradiction
of his former all.egations or acts. If an
act or admission is susceptible of two constructions, one of which is consistent with
a right asserted by the party sought to
be estopped, it forms no estoppel. 31
C. J. S. (Estopp·el) Section 77.
This case certainly does not meet the foregoing
test. The most that could be said of Nir. McDaniels'
letter 1s that it is ambiguous and uncertain, and a least
as susceptionable to the construction we place thereon
as the· contruction urged by defendant. It being susceptible to the construction we place thereon, and such
construction being consistent with the right asserted
by plaintiff, the letter creates no estoppel.
One other comment with regard to the defense of
estoppeL Counsel for defendant loosely speak of plaintiff's failure fo1 a period of "five years" to prosecute
his action, and of a ''five year vacation'', well recognizing that such eXJaggeration may tend to prejudice the
plaintiff. Let's stick to the facts. Defendant admits
the claim was still pending with it in May, 1946. This
action was filed in May, 1949. The period is three years,
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not five, and an exa.mi:nation of the reoord before this
court will make apparent that the delay in bringing the
action to immediate trial, once it \ras filPd, \Vas no more
the fault of plaintiff than defendant. And we ea n 't
help obserYing- at this point that "·hile the lo\\. er eourt 's
judgment \vas entered Deeember ~2, 1950, that it was
not until ~lay 23, 1951, or oYer fiye months later, that
plaintiff's briefs were served and filed. We appreciate
that defendant and its counsel have other matters
requiring their attention, and make reference to it only
for the purpose of demonstrating that there are reasons
for delay often not apparent from the face of the record.

POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
ENTERING ITS FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND IN ENTER""
ING ITS JUDGMENT UPON SUCH FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS.
Except for one matter, everything covered by this
point has heretofore been answered in thi·s brief, and
we will not prolong the same by making further reference
thereto.
The single matter that does require consideration
hereunder relates to the applicability of Rule 55 (b) to
the case of sickness. Such rule is as follows:
"Yardmen taking leave of absence for a period
in excess of ten days must secure and fill out
form 153 so the leave will he covered as a ma.tter of record. ''
It was and is the plaintiff's contention that such
rule has no application to an absence occasioned hy
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sickness, ·and that a proper discharge cannot be -predieated thereon in the case of an employee wh·o is absent ·_ .
in exeess of ten days because of sickness, and who has
not filled out such form. On the other hand, defendant
insisted in the lower eourt, and we assume it is still
its position, that such rule applies in the case of sickness or accident or other unforseen contingency the
same as in the case of an employee absenting himself
for purely personal reasons. The point scarcely me-rits
argument. How can it apply to one who is home sick
in bed, or in the hospital suffering · from an accident?
How may an employee who is taken sick today kn-ow
whether his illness will be such as to necessitate his
absence be-yond a period of ten days~
Defendant attempts to answer· that by saying that
in such a case a phone call by the individual, or by someone on his behalf, will suffice. But such a phone call
isn't a -c-ompliance with the rule, and one it is admitted
that a phone call, in the case of sickness or accident,
will suffice, then it is admitted that the rule has no application in the case of those contingencies.
But. even if it be conceded that a phone call should
have been made, as defendant would have it, is the
reco~d clear on the point that such communication by
phone wasn't made within the ten-day period 1 The
last day that plaintiff worked was July 21, 1945. From
the transcript of the hearing (Exhibit "A") it appears
that on July 31st, 1945, which was the lOth day and so
within the period, plaintiff received a phone call from
defendant, at which time he told defendant that he was
sick. True, there is some discrepancy between the transcript of the hearing and the pleading:s, in tha.t in the
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latter the da.te of .this phone call is referred to as being
on August 1st, but we submit that in the light of the evidence it may "!"ell be that the phone enll W'H-S 'vithin the
ten-day period, in "~hich rase it meets eYen de.fendant 's
theory.
We submit, however, that a phone call isn't within
the rule. The rule calls for 'Yritten notice on Form 153,
and notice other than as specified doesn't meet the rule.
On its face the rule does not, nor can it in the very
nature of thing"~S, apply to an absence occasioned by
sickness.
Accordingly, the only question the court had to
determine, other than the measure of damages, was
whether the defendant was justified in disc.harging
plaintiff for being absent in excess of ten days without
having filled out Form 153. To make this determination the court had to ·construe the discharge· in the light
of Rule 38, which required notice of the charge, a hearing thereon, and guilt established. If plaintiff violated Rule 55, it was because he wasn't sick. And all
of the evidence adduced at the hearing on the charge
against him established that he was sick. The court
therefore concluded, as it of necessity had to, that at
the hearing it was established that plaintiff's absence
was occasioned hy sickness ; that because of such sickness as so established 1.\e had not violated the Rule; and
there being no violation of the Rule the discharge predicated thereon was. wrongful.
As this answering brief is rapidly drawing to a
close, one or two further observation should he made
relative to defendant's discharge of the plaintiff, and
the legal consequences thereof.
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Defendant maintains that Rule 55 (b) applies under
all circumstances and violations, including sickness and
ac.cident. Assttming, without conceding, that this anomaly is in fact the correct interpretation of this provision of the contract, and that plaintiff's failure to fill
out form 153 constituted a violation thereof, the violation of the Rule still is not sufficient to justify the
discharge under adjudicated decisions. We say this for
two reasons; first, to justify a discharge upon the violation of the· rule, it must be shown that the violation
was willful and intentional; and, second, to justify the
discharge upon the violation of the rule, it must he shown
that plaintiff knew the violation of the rule would be
considered by the defendant as grounds for discharge.
Now as to the first premise; that is, that plaintiff's
violation must be willful and intentional. In the ease
of Ehlers v. Langley, (Calif.) 237 Pac. 55 the court held:
''Although it is not necessary that the violation
be perverse or malicious, or that it be the result
of an evil intent toward the master, it must be
made clear that the thing done or omitted to be
done was done or omitted intentionally, the rule
being grounded on the theory that willful disohedience of specific instructions of the master,
if such instructions be reasonable and consistent
with the contract of employment, is a breach
of duty-a breach of the. contract of service;
and like any other breach of contract, of itself
entitles the master to renounce the contract of
employment.''
In Goudal v. DeM·Vlle Pictures Corp., (Calif.) 5
Pac. (2) 433, it was held:
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"To constitute· a refusal or failure to perform
. tlie conditions of a contract of employment such
as 've haYe here, there must be, dn the part of
the actress, a willful act or willful misconduct.
C~Iay Y. ~ e"T l'" ork ~lotion Picture Corp. 45 Cal.
App. 396, 187 P. 785; Ehlers Y. Langley &
~Iichaels Co. 7~ t~al. App. 21±, 237 P. 55)".
So even thoug-h it be said that the failure of an
incapacitated employee to secure and fill out Form 153
covering his absence constitutes a technical violation
of the rule, still such Yiolation, being neither willful
nor intentional cannot be used by the employer as a
ground for discharge.
Second, to justify the discharg·e, it must be shown
that the plainti~f knew that his failure to secure and
fill out Form 153 might be used by his employer as a
ground for dis·charge. True it is, in this case, defendant proved that it had in the past used a violation of
Rule 153 as a reason for discharge, but it did not prove,
nor offer to prove, it had ever discharged an employee
for violating the rule where the violation resulted from
illness or accident.
We submit the following cases as authority for the
proposition that the defendant could not properly discharge this employee for a violation of the rule resulting from illness without a showing that it had in the
past invoked the same penalty .against other employees
for similar violations.
National Labor Relations Board v. Kohen-LigonFolz, 128 F. (2) 502;
National Labor Relation Board v. Weyerhouser
Timber Co., 132 F. (2) 234;
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National Labor Relations Board
Co., i13 F. (2) 759;

v.

Viking Pump

N~ational

Labor Relations Board v. Empire W ortsed
Mills, 129 F. {2) 688;
National Labor Relatiqns Board v. Oregon Worster
Mills, 96 F. (2) 193.
Finally, as the rule itself states, the filling out of the
form is solely to make the absence a matter of record.
Unless, therefore, defendant has shown (and it has
not) that in failing to have a form covering this particular absence as a matter of record it has been adversely
affected, the purely technical violation of the rule could
not be relied upon as a basis for discharge. Moreover,
that the filling out of the form is merely for the record
shows that the requirement of the rule relates only to
voluntary absences.
Imagine an emp loyee being
required to fill out 'a form stating in substance, "I hereby apply for a leave of absence for the purpose of being
sick for a. period in exc.ess of ten days''.
1

The trial court, accordingly, did not err in entering findings of fact and conclusions of law as it did, nor
in entering judgment as i~ did on such findings and
conclusions.
CONCLUSION
We respec.tly submit that the judgment of the lower
court should be affirmed
Respeetfully submitted,

HOWELL, STINE AND OLMSTEAD
CLYDE C. PATTERSON
Attorneys for Respondent
62

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

j

